BUYER-SUPPLIER INTERACTION, ASSET SPECIFICITY, AND PRODUCT CHOICE by Nisvan Erkal
  ISSN  0819-2642 






THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 









BUYER-SUPPLIER INTERACTION, ASSET 






   
Department of Economics 
The University of Melbourne  
Melbourne      Victoria     3010 
Australia. 
 Buyer-Supplier Interaction, Asset Speciﬁcity,
and Product Choice1
Nisvan Erkal2
First version:J u l y2 0 0 2
This version: May 2006
1This paper is based on the third chapter of my dissertation. I am thankful to Rachel Kranton, Dan
Vincent and Larry Ausubel for their comments. I am particularly grateful to Debby Minehart and
Anne van den Nouweland for the detailed comments they have given me on several drafts of this paper.
I also wish to thank Suren Basov, John Creedy, Catherine de Fontenay, Joshua Gans, Stephen King,
Christian Roessler, and seminar participants at the Australian Economic Theory Workshop (2003), the
30th Annual Conference of EARIE (2003), International Industrial Organization Conference (2004),
Australian National University, University of Arkansas, and University of Oregon for their comments.
All errors are my own.
2Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia. E-mail:
n.erkal@unimelb.edu.au.Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explore how the demand for speciﬁc investments may aﬀect the
product variety in a bilateral duopolistic industry. In the literature on the hold-up problem,
it is generally assumed that the degree of speciﬁcity of investments is either exogenously
determined or chosen by the suppliers. We develop a model where the degree of speciﬁcity
of investments is endogenously determined through the product choices of both buyers and
suppliers. In an environment where input prices are determined by bilateral negotiations,
the existence of alternative buyers causes suppliers to choose less-than-fully-specialized input
types. We show that their location and investment choices crucially depend on the degree of
product diﬀerentiation in the downstream market. This implies that the buyers may choose
to increase their own competition by producing more similar products in order to increase
the suppliers’ investment incentives. We also analyze the impact of capacity constraints on
the structure of the upstream market and show that if the suppliers do not face capacity
constraints, only one supplier serves the downstream market in equilibrium.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L11, L23, R12
Keywords: asset speciﬁcity, vertical interactions, product diﬀerentiation1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It has long been recognized that the incompleteness of contracts may result in reduced incen-
tives to invest in the context of bilateral relationships (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985;
Hart, 1995). The extent of underinvestment depends on whether there exist alternative uses
for the investments made. More speciﬁc investments have higher values for the buyers for
which they are intended, but are less valuable in other uses. A large literature in economics
discusses how ﬁrms may rely on alternative governance structures, such as vertical integration
or long-term supply arrangements, to encourage speciﬁc investments.
The goal of this paper is to explore how the demand for speciﬁc investments may aﬀect
the product variety in a bilateral duopolistic industry. We consider a model of diﬀerentiated
products where speciﬁc investments arise because there is an ideal input type corresponding
to each possible variety of a ﬁnal good.1 Suppliers of inputs make two kinds of decisions:
they choose what type of input to produce and how much eﬀort to put into it. The degree of
speciﬁcity of their input to a given buyer in the downstream market depends on how suitable
the input is for the purposes of that buyer as well as how suitable it is for the purposes of
alternative buyers. This implies that the degree of product diﬀerentiation in the downstream
market plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the alternative uses suppliers have for their
inputs. If there are downstream ﬁrms which demand similar inputs, suppliers have better
alternative uses for their inputs and, hence, exert a higher eﬀort in developing them.
In this context, the analysis focuses on two questions. First, what is the impact of
downstream buyers’ choice of product diﬀerentiation on the location and investment choices of
upstream suppliers? Second, how does the downstream buyers’ concern about the investment
incentives of the upstream suppliers alter their product choices? Both questions are analyzed
1It is emphasized in the product management literature that the distinctiveness of two ﬁnal goods may
signiﬁcantly depend on the distinctiveness of the inputs used in their production (Robertson and Ulrich, 1998).
For example, the distinctiveness of two cars may substantially depend on the type of engine components used
in their production. Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) explain the close links that exist between ﬁrms’ choices of
inputs and their decisions regarding which product variety to produce.
1in a model where input prices are determined by bilateral negotiations, which is a common
occurrence in markets for intermediate goods.
Capacity constraints play a key role in determining whether suppliers have alternative
uses for their inputs. We consider two types of industries, one where suppliers are capacity
constrained and one where they are not. The existence of a capacity-constrained supplier
confers a positive externality on the other suppliers in an input industry. If a supplier has
limited capacity and cannot completely meet the input demand of its buyer, rival suppliers
may be left with an outside option that increases their bargaining power. If the suppliers
do not have capacity constraints, then a buyer’s demand is more likely to be satisﬁed by its
preferred supplier. This implies that rival suppliers may have no alternative uses for their
inputs in equilibrium. However, the buyers can always turn to an alternative supplier if they
cannot reach an agreement with their own supplier.
The results show that with capacity constraints, the existence of alternative buyers causes
suppliers to choose less-than-fully-specialized input types. Their investment incentives cru-
cially depend on the degree of product diﬀerentiation in the downstream market. This implies
that the buyers may choose to increase their own competition by producing more similar prod-
ucts in order to increase the suppliers’ investment incentives. Hence, in contrast with the
maximum diﬀerentiation result of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), ﬁrms may not always choose
to be maximally diﬀerentiated in an eﬀort to decrease the competition between themselves.
The results also reveal that the existence of capacity constraints has an important impact
on the structure of the upstream market. Speciﬁcally, if the suppliers do not face capacity
constraints, only one supplier serves the downstream market in equilibrium. The buyers are
willing to use an input type that is diﬀerent from their ideal variety in order to beneﬁtf r o m
the higher eﬀort that the supplier puts into the developing the input.
The Harvard Business School case on Crown Cork and Seal Company, Inc. (CCS) illus-
trates how the hold-up problem can result in strategic location choice (Gordon, Reed and
2Hamermesh, 1977).2 In the 1960s and 1970s, CCS made metal cans for the soft-drink indus-
try. In the metal can industry, suppliers generally located their plants next to customers in
order to minimize transportation costs. This exposed them to hold-up. CCS was "unusual
in that it set up no plants to service a single customer" (Gordon et al., 1977, p. 11). Instead,
it made sure there were a number of customers for which it could provide products near its
plants. Hence, although CCS specialized in customer service, it deliberately located between
potential buyers in order to avoid the hold-up problem. It tailored the speciﬁcations of the
cans to the customers’ requirements, but stood ready to modify them if necessary.
The results of this paper also suggest one explanation for the use of common inputs, i.e.,
platform sharing, which has become a common practice in the automobile industry (Robert-
son and Ulrich, 1998). According to our model, ﬁrms may choose to produce similar products
and, thus, use similar inputs in order to improve their suppliers’ investment incentives.
This paper contributes to both the literature on the hold-up problem and the literature on
product choice by bringing the issues raised in them together in a single model and showing
the interdependence between them. In the literature on the hold-up problem, the endogenous
choice of input speciﬁcity has been explored by Choi and Yi (2000), Church and Gandal
(2000), McLaren (2000), and Grossman and Helpman (2002).3 One of the core elements of
these papers is that an integrated supplier chooses to produce a more speciﬁc input than an
unintegrated supplier. Hence, vertical integration confers a negative externality on the other
ﬁrms in the industry.4 This paper diﬀers by demonstrating the impact of speciﬁc investments
on another aspect of ﬁrm behavior, that of product choice. Previous papers assume that the
buyers’ product choices are exogenously determined and analyze the suppliers’ choice of
speciﬁcity. We analyze how the degree of speciﬁcity and the suppliers’ investment incentives
2I am grateful to Michael Raith for pointing out this case study to me.
3Choi and Yi (2000) and Church and Gandal (2000) develop models of vertical foreclosure with endogenous
choice of input speciﬁcations. McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) explore how international
trade aﬀects the vertical structure of an industry.
4Riordan and Williamson (1985) also analyze the impact of asset speciﬁcity on ﬁrm boundaries. However,
they do not consider how the decisions of other ﬁrms in the industry may aﬀect the behavior of a speciﬁc ﬁrm.
3depend on the strategic product choices made by ﬁrms on both sides of the market.
This paper is also related to Inderst and Wey (2003a), who focus on horizontal mergers in
bilaterally oligopolistic industries. They show that ﬁrms may merge either to enhance their
bargaining power or to aﬀect their suppliers’ incentives to make non-contractible investments
w h i l ew es h o wt h a tﬁrms may strategically choose their locations in order to improve either
their bargaining power or their suppliers’ investment incentives.
There exists an extensive literature on product diﬀerentiation and economic geography.
Current theories of horizontal product diﬀerentiation have been very much inﬂuenced by the
“Main Street” model of Hotelling (1929). Ever since d’Aspremont et al. (1979) challenged
the “Principle of Minimum Diﬀerentiation” argued by Hotelling (1929), there have been
numerous attempts to establish the validity of this principle.5 In the economic geography
literature, several papers focus on the so-called “Marshallian externalities” and increasing
returns to explain the formation of economic clusters.6
In this literature, the current paper is most closely related to Belleﬂamme and Toulemonde
(2003). They illustrate that downstream and upstream ﬁrms may choose to agglomerate in
an eﬀort to decrease their costs because the upstream ﬁrms experience economies of scale.
This paper diﬀers by focusing on the role played by non-contractible investments in product
choice. We analyze how capacity constraints may aﬀect the ﬁrms’ product choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present the details of the model in the next section.
Section 3 discusses the bargaining outcome. Sections 4 and 5 present the results on the
product and investment choices of the upstream suppliers and downstream buyers respec-
tively. Section 6 concludes by suggesting avenues for future research. All the proofs are in
the Appendix.
5See, for example, de Palma, et al. (1985), Friedman and Thisse (1993), and Rhee, et al. (1992).
6In his pioneering work, Marshall (1890) oﬀered several reasons, such as mass-production and the avail-
ability of specialized inputs, in order to explain the phenomenon of localized industries. See the discussion in
Fujita and Thisse (1996) regarding the literature based on his ideas.
42M o d e l
2.1 Consumers and production technology
We employ the setting of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), who modify the standard Hotelling
(1929) model of spatial competition by assuming quadratic consumer transportation costs.
The market region is described by the unit interval [0,1]. Consumers are uniformly distributed
along the line market and the location of a consumer is denoted by x ∈ [0,1].T w od o w n s t r e a m
buyers, B1 and B2, produce diﬀerentiated products. They choose to locate at distances b1
and b2 from the two ends of the unit line. Without loss of generality, we assume that B1 is
located to the left of B2: 0 ≤ b1 ≤ 1 − b2 ≤ 1. We can interpret the location choices of the
ﬁrms as product design selections within the space of horizontal characteristics.
Each consumer purchases exactly one unit from the ﬁrm oﬀe r i n gi ta tt h el o w e re ﬀective
price, namely the mill price plus the transportation cost. A consumer of type x purchasing
from buyer Bi gets utility
U (x,bi,p i)=S − pi − t(x − bi)
2 ,i =1 ,2 (1)
where S represents the gross surplus from consumption, pi stands for the price at which buyer
i oﬀers its good, and t is a measure of consumer loyalty. When t =0 , the consumer simply
chooses the product with the lowest price and is indiﬀerent about which variety is consumed.
Disutility costs vary quadratically with the distance between the product produced by the
ﬁrm and that which is most preferred by the consumer. As shown in d’Aspremont et al.
(1979), this assumption prevents discontinuities in the proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms.
The proﬁt functions of the downstream ﬁrms have the general form
πi (p1,p 2)=( pi − ci)Di (p1,p 2) − Fi,i =1 ,2 (2)
where ci and Fi denote the marginal and ﬁxed cost of production respectively. Di (p1,p 2)
stands for the demand for buyer Bi’s product. We assume that the magnitudes of S and Fi
are such that the market is covered, i.e., all consumers purchase.
5Each ﬁrm in the downstream industry, Bi, can decrease its ﬁxed cost of production by
procuring a specialized input from a supplier in an upstream industry. For example, the input
can be a software developed to organize the databases of the ﬁrm in a better way. We assume
that the inputs decrease the buyers’ ﬁxed cost of production, rather than their marginal cost
of production, for tractability reasons.7
Each type of ﬁnal good has an ideal input associated with it. The unit interval represents
both the space of possible input types and the space of possible ﬁnal goods. The upstream
industry consists of two suppliers, S1 and S2, which choose to locate at distances s1 and s2
from the two ends of the unit line. By choosing where to locate, the suppliers decide for which
variety of the ﬁnal good to produce an ideal input. A buyer located at bi gets the maximum
beneﬁt from using the input produced by the supplier located at bi = si.B u y e r Bi can
also use an input produced by a supplier located at a diﬀerent point along the unit interval,
but the beneﬁt from using a less-than-ideal input decreases with the degree of diﬀerentiation
between the locations of the buyer and the supplier.
More precisely, let Fi = Ki represent Bi’s ﬁxed cost of production if it does not purchase
any inputs. Consider buyer Bi and supplier Si located at bi and si from one end of the unit
interval respectively. We assume that the beneﬁt Bi receives from using an input produced
by Si is a decreasing and concave function of the distance between Bi and Si.T h a t i s ,
the marginal disutility from using an input variety that is diﬀerent from the ideal one is an
increasing function of the distance between si and bi, |bi − si|.S p e c i ﬁcally, each unit of input
that Bi procures from Si reduces its ﬁxed cost of production by ei
h
1 − (bi − si)
2
i
,w h e r eei
is the amount of investment made by Si. This implies that if bi = si, the buyer receives a
7If the suppliers invest to decrease the buyers’ marginal cost of production instead of their ﬁxed cost of
production, the locations of the buyers can aﬀect the investment decisions of the suppliers in two diﬀerent
ways. A change in the locations of the buyers would cause a change in both the amount of proﬁts made in the
downstream market and the outside options of the ﬁrms. As in McLaren (2000), our current set-up allows us
to diﬀerentiate between these two and concentrate on the latter one. Although it would be natural to allow
the inputs to aﬀect the marginal cost of production, it would result in a substantial amount of additional
complication without improving our illustration of the main points of the paper.
6ﬁxed cost reduction of ei. The buyers can mix and match the inputs produced by diﬀerent
suppliers. For example, if Bi purchases one unit from supplier Si and one unit from supplier
Sj,i t sﬁxed cost is reduced by ei
h





1 − (1 − sj − bi)
2
i
. We assume the
parameter values are such that the total cost reduction that can be obtained from the inputs
is less than or equal to Ki.
The input prices and purchases are determined by bilateral negotiations in the input
markets. The speciﬁc value that Fi takes in (2) is determined as a result of this process. The
details of the bargaining process are explained in Section 2.3.
In the input development stage, the suppliers choose both the input variety they would
like to produce and their eﬀort level. We assume that the suppliers’ cost of eﬀort is e2
i.T h e
environment is one of incomplete contracting. Due to the uncertain nature of the innovation
process, the parties cannot sign enforceable ex ante contracts for the delivery of a speciﬁc
innovation (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). The precise nature of the required input is revealed
only ex post and the parties cannot commit to refrain from renegotiation.8 For example,
Helper and Levine (1992) state that in the automotive industry, contracts with suppliers are
necessarily incomplete because of the complexity of the parts.9
As is well known, the absence of ex ante contracts results in the hold-up problem in
the investment stage. We assume that vertical integration is not a desirable way of dealing
with the potential underinvestment problem because of internal incentive and coordination
problems. Hence, we focus on the impact of the hold-up problem on the ﬁrms’ product
choices.
2.2 Timeline
The ﬁrms play the following four-stage non-cooperative game.
8Such an argument is in line with the models developed in Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) in
order to deﬁne contractual incompleteness precisely.
9They state that "since engineering changes are common, the part actually produced by the supplier is
often not the same as the part that was contracted for" (p. 567).
7Stage 1: The buyers choose their locations along the unit line. After the location choices
are made, each buyer contacts a supplier and provides the supplier with the characteristics
of the input it requires. This information also allows the supplier to choose any location in
the input space. Without loss of generality, assume that Bi contacts Si, i =1 ,2.
Stage 2: The suppliers simultaneously decide both where to locate along the unit line
and how much to invest in the development of a prototype. We assume that the suppliers
cannot observe each other’s location choices before making their investment decisions.
Stage 3: After the suppliers choose their locations and develop their prototypes, the buyers
and suppliers meet in the market for inputs. They negotiate and contract over the quantities
to be delivered and the payments to be paid. The details of the bargaining process are given
in Section 2.3.
Stage 4: After the trade of inputs takes place, the buyers simultaneously choose the
output prices at which they are willing to sell their products.
2.3 Ex-post bargaining
We consider a simple bilateral bargaining game that allows us to demonstrate the main
points of the paper.10 The bargaining game consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, buyer
Bi approaches the supplier it has contacted after choosing its location and they bargain over
price. If the negotiations between Bi and Si f a i l ,t h e yc a nt r yt oﬁnd other partners in the
second stage of bargaining and bargain with them. Speciﬁcally, Si can try to approach Bj
and Bi can try to approach Sj,w h e r ei 6= j. We assume that once the ﬁrst-stage negotiations
fail, Bi and Si cannot meet to bargain again. If the second round of negotiations also fails,
10See Grossman and Helpman (2002) and McLaren (2000) for two alternative simple price determination
mechanisms. Grossman and Helpman (2002) consider a similar two-stage bargaining model, where they assume
that in the ﬁrst stage, the negotiations between the parties can fail with some exogenous probability. McLaren
(2000) assumes that buyers submit bids for the inputs of the suppliers in a model of technological uncertainty.
He assumes that inputs may turn out to be of high or low quality, and high-quality non-speciﬁc inputs create
a higher value than low-quality speciﬁc inputs. See, on the other hand, de Fontenay and Gans (2005) for a
more fully speciﬁed bargaining game, where each upstream-downstream pair negotiates sequentially over the
quantity supplied and a price. All these approaches would yield qualitatively similar results.
8there are no more opportunities for trade.
We assume the parties split the surplus from bargaining equally in both rounds of ne-
gotiations. During the negotiations, the parties’ outside options make a diﬀerence in their
bargaining positions. In the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game, the parties negotiate knowing
that if their negotiations fail, they may have the option of dealing with an alternative partner
in the second stage. Therefore, the second stage of the bargaining game determines the values
of the parties’ outside options in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game.
The next section demonstrates that whether the suppliers are capacity-constrained plays
a critical role in the ability of the ﬁrms to ﬁnd alternative partners in the second stage of the
bargaining game.
3 Bargaining Outcomes
We are interested in ﬁnding the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game outlined in
Section 2.1. Therefore, we work backward from the determination of the output prices.
Consider the ﬁnal-stage subgame, where the buyers compete by choosing prices for given
locations b1 and 1−b2. They maximize (2). The ﬁrms’ demand functions can be determined
by deﬁning the indiﬀerent consumer. We get
D1 (p1,p 2)=
(p2 − p1)
2t(1 − b1 − b2)
+




D2 (p1,p 2)=1− D1 (p1,p 2).( 4 )
After substituting for these demand functions in the proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms given in
(2), we can solve for the Nash equilibrium in prices. Assuming symmetry, we have c1 = c2 = c
and K1 = K2 = K.S o l v i n g t h e ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization in prices
simultaneously yields the result that buyer Bi’s equilibrium price is equal to
p∗
i (bi,b j)=c +
t(3 + bi − bj)(1− bi − bj)
3
.( 5 )
9It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition is satisﬁed. The equilibrium
price level is not aﬀected by the suppliers’ location and investment choices because the inputs
bought aﬀect the ﬁxed costs of production only.
In the third stage of the game, the parties decide whether to trade after observing the
location and investment choices made in the previous stages of the game. They know what
the equilibrium prices will be in the last stage of the game. We are interested in solving for
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game speciﬁed in Section 2.3. We start
in the next section by considering cases where the production technology of the buyers is
such that they can make use of more units of the input than the suppliers can provide them
with. This implies that the suppliers are capacity-constrained relative to the buyers’ needs
and total demand in the market exceeds total supply.11
3.1 Capacity Constraints
To keep the analysis simple, suppose the suppliers can produce at most one unit of input
while the buyers can make use of up to two units of the input.12 Hence, after supplier Si
chooses its location and invests ei to develop the input, it brings the input to the marketplace
for trade. The marginal cost of producing a second unit is formidably high.
The existence of capacity constraints ensures that a supplier can always ﬁnd another
buyer to deal with after a failed negotiation. Since each buyer can use up to two units of
the input and each supplier has only one unit to sell, Si can oﬀer its unit for sale to Bj if it
cannot agree with Bi in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game, where i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.
Proposition 1 presents the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game as a function
11Hart and Tirole (1990) also consider the role capacity constraints play in the context of vertical interac-
tions. In contrast with the current analysis, they analyze the impact of capacity constraints on the incentives
to vertically integrate. They refer to the cases of capacity constraints and no capacity constraints as scarce
supplies and scarce needs respectively. See also Inderst and Wey (2003b) who analyze the impact of buyer
power in the context of both capacity constraints and no capacity constraints.
12Our goal is to distinguish between cases when total demand in the input market exceeds total supply and
cases when it does not. To achieve this, we ﬁx the buyers’ demand and vary the amount the suppliers can
supply. Assuming that the buyers can use more than two units of input would not change the results in any
substantial way.
10of b1, b2, s1, s2, e1 and e2.
Proposition 1 Given b1, b2, s1, s2, e1 and e2, consider the inequality C (i) deﬁned as
ei
∙³











where i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.T h el a b e lC (i) stands for the case of capacity constraints.
(i) If C (i) holds for i =1 ,2,t h e nBi and Si trade one unit in the ﬁrst stage of the
bargaining game. Their payoﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
































(ii) If C (i) holds but C (j) does not, then Bi buys one unit from Si in the ﬁrst stage of
the bargaining game and another unit from Sj in the second stage of the bargaining game.
Bj does not buy any inputs. The payoﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗

























































(iii) If C (i) does not hold for i =1 ,2, Bi buys one unit from Sj (where i 6= j)i nt h e
second stage of the bargaining game. The payoﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗


















11Proposition 1 states the necessary and suﬃcient condition for trade to take place between
Bi and Si. The inequality C (i) g i v e ni n( 6 )i m p l i e st h a tBi and Si trade if the surplus created
is nonnegative. The surplus created is the diﬀerence between the beneﬁto fSi’s input to Bi
and Si’s outside option. If Si does not trade with Bi, it can trade with Bj in the second
stage of the bargaining game. Hence, trade takes place between Bi and Si if it results in a
higher value than what Si c a ne a r nb yt r a d i n gw i t hBj. Whether or not Bj and Sj trade has
no bearing on the decision of Bi and Si since Bj can purchase a second unit of input from
Si even if it has purchased one unit of input from Sj in the ﬁrst period.
To clarify the implication of the assumption that the suppliers are capacity-constrained
relative to the buyers’ needs, consider the case of Si. Suppose the rival supplier, Sj,h a sa
capacity constraint which implies that it supplies less than Bj can make use of. Hence, Si can
always ﬁnd an alternative buyer to negotiate with in the second stage of the bargaining game
if the negotiation in the ﬁrst stage fails. This improves Si’s bargaining position in the ﬁrst
stage if Si has a capacity constraint relative to Bi’s need. If Si is not capacity-constrained,
it can sell units to Bj whether or not it trades with Bi and the potential trade with Bj does
not have the impact of improving Si’s bargaining position in the ﬁrst-stage negotiation with
Bi.
Similar reasoning implies that since Bi can make use of more units of input than Si can
supply, whether or not Bi trades with Sj in the second stage does not have a bearing on
its bargaining position in the ﬁr s ts t a g e . W ec a ns e et h i si nc a s e( i i )a b o v e ,w h e r eC (i)
holds but C (j) does not. Since C (j) does not hold, Bj and Sj do not trade in the ﬁrst




1 − (1 − sj − bi)
2
´
. However, a comparison of WBi in case (i) with WBi in
case (ii) shows that it does not increase the amount Bi receives of the surplus created in the
negotiation with Si.
Since the buyers do not have any outside options, the inequality C (i) does not depend
on the location and investment choices of the alternative supplier in the market. Taking the
12derivative of the left hand side of C (i) with respect to si shows that it is decreasing in si
for si ≥ bi − (1 − bi − bj), which, as shown in the Section 4, always holds in equilibrium.
Hence, trade is less likely to take place between parties that are located further away from
each other.
Having a constrained capacity helps the suppliers. If C (i) holds, Si’s payoﬀ is given by
its share of the surplus created when it sells its unit of input to Bi and the value of its outside
option. If C (i) does not hold, Si’s payoﬀ is determined by its share of the surplus created
when it sells its unit of input to Bj. This is given in case (iii). In this case, the supplier does
not receive the value of its outside option because trade takes place in the second stage of
the bargaining game. As stated in Section 2.3, if the second-stage negotiations fail, there are
no more opportunities for trade.
The buyers’ payoﬀs depend on how many units of input they can purchase. In case (i),
each obtain one unit in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. In case (ii), C (j) does not
hold and both suppliers sell their inputs to Bi. Bj does not obtain any inputs. In case (iii),
each buyer purchases one unit in the second stage of the bargaining game.
3.2 No Capacity Constraints
Consider now the case when the suppliers are not capacity-constrained relative to the buyers’
needs. We continue to assume that the buyers can make use of up to two units of the
input. The suppliers ﬁrst invest to develop a prototype. Once they spend e2
i to develop the
prototype, the cost of producing additional units of the input is zero.13
The existence of unconstrained suppliers implies that the buyers can always ﬁnd an alter-
native supplier if the negotiations in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game fail. The subgame
perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game is presented in Proposition 2.
13The more general case where the suppliers have convex costs of production is not treated in this paper.
Analyzing the cases of capacity constraints and no capacity constraints separately allows us to emphasize their
diﬀerent implications and avoid unnecessary complications. Assuming that the suppliers have convex costs of
production would not change the results qualitatively.
13Proposition 2 Given b1, b2, s1, s2, e1 and e2, consider the inequality NC(i) deﬁned as
ei
³












where i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j.T h el a b e lNC(i) stands for the case of no capacity constraints.
(i) If NC(i) holds for i =1 ,2,t h e nBi and Si trades two units in the ﬁrst stage of the
bargaining game. Bi and Si’s payoﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ei
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(ii) If NC(i) holds but NC(j) does not, then Bi buys two units from Si in the ﬁrst stage
and Bj buys two units from Si i nt h es e c o n ds t a g eo ft h eb a r g a i n i n gg a m e .T h ep a y o ﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ei
³



















2) − K + ei
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2 − (bi − si)












WSj =0 . (21)
(iii) If NC(i) does not hold for i =1 ,2, Bi buys two units from Sj,w h e r ei 6= j,i nt h e
second stage of the bargaining game. Si and Bi’s payoﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ej
³










The inequality NC(i) given in (15) implies that in the case of no capacity constraints,
the suppliers do not have any outside options. The gains from trade are determined by the
diﬀerence between the beneﬁto fSi’s input to Bi and Bi’s outside option. When the suppliers
are not capacity-constrained, the buyers always have an outside option and the value of their
outside option depends on the alternative supplier’s location and investment choices. Hence,
14unlike C (i), NC(i) also depends on sj and ej.A ni n c r e a s ei nej or a decrease in sj (which
causes Sj to locate closer to Bi)m a k e sBi’s outside option more attractive. Hence, it is
more likely to hold as ei increases or as Si moves closer to Bi, and is less likely to hold as ej
increases or as Sj moves closer to Bi.
Proposition 2 indicates that depending on whether NC(i) holds for i =1 ,2, either the
buyers deal with diﬀerent suppliers or they both deal with the same supplier in equilibrium. In
case (i), the buyers procure inputs from diﬀerent suppliers in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining
game. Their payoﬀs are given by their share of the surplus created and the value of their
outside option. In case (ii), both buyers procure inputs from the same supplier in diﬀerent
stages of the bargaining game. The second supplier makes zero. Finally, in case (iii), the
buyers procure inputs from diﬀerent suppliers in the second stage of the bargaining game.
Hence, they receive their share of the surplus created but not the value of their outside option.
4 Product and Investment Choices in the Upstream Market
In the second stage of the game outlined in Section 2.1, the suppliers simultaneously choose
the input variety they would like to produce and their investment levels. In this section
we analyze their choices ﬁrst in the case of capacity constraints and then in the case of no
capacity constraints.
4.1 Capacity Constraints
Supplier Si maximizes its earnings net of investment costs taking bi, bj, sj and ej as given.
Its earnings in the input market for any given set of bi, bj, si, sj, ei and ej are presented
in Proposition 1. Since the suppliers choose their locations after the buyers, their decisions
reﬂect the extent to which their production is customized to a speciﬁc buyer. Their optimal
location and investment choices are presented in Proposition 3.
15Proposition 3 For given values of bi and bj, Si’s equilibrium choices of location and invest-
ment are
sc
i (bi,b j)=bi +










Evaluating C (i) given in (6) at these values reveals that in equilibrium each supplier sells
its unit of input in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. It is more advantageous for the
suppliers to trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining process when they can use the possibility
to trade with the alternative buyer in the second stage to strengthen their bargaining position.
The location choice given in Proposition 3 implies that the suppliers always locate between
the two buyers. Fully specialized inputs maximize the surplus within the intended interaction
while minimizing the value of the outside option. The suppliers pick their locations in the
input space strategically in order to improve their bargaining positions. The expression for
sc
i (bi,b j) indicates that while choosing their locations, the suppliers try to balance the value
created within the relationship and the value of their outside option. How closely they locate
to the buyer with which they intend to trade depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation
in the downstream market, which is represented by 1 − bi − bj.
Corollary 1 The suppliers choose to produce less specialized inputs as the degree of product
diﬀerentiation in the downstream market increases.
To illustrate, consider for a moment the scenario where we ﬁx the distance between the
supplier and one of the buyers, and increase the degree of product diﬀerentiation in the
downstream market by moving the other buyer further away. This causes the input of the
supplier to become more speciﬁc even though the distance between its location and the
location of its intended trading partner does not change. The supplier’s input still has the
same beneﬁt for the intended buyer, but the payoﬀ the supplier expects to get is lower because
16the value of its outside option is reduced. This causes the supplier to re-adjust its location to
compensate for the increase in the speciﬁcity of its input. Hence, when the buyers choose to
produce more diﬀerentiated products, the suppliers choose to produce less specialized inputs
because they do not want to produce an input type that is too unsuitable for the purposes
of the alternative buyer in the market.
We next consider how the investment choices of the suppliers depend on the product
choices of the buyers. Let γ =( 1− bi − bj). The partial derivative of ec






(1 − bi − bj)
6
< 0 (26)
for 1 − bj − bi > 0. Thus, except for cases when the buyers are located at the same point,
i.e., when bi =1− bj, Si’s investment choice increases as the buyers approach each other.
Corollary 2 The suppliers’ investment choices increase as the degree of product diﬀerentia-
tion in the downstream market decreases.
A st h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation decreases, both the distance between Si and Bi,
and the distance between Si and Bj decreases. This is because after observing bi and bj,
the suppliers always choose to locate between the two buyers. The decrease in the distance
between Si and Bi causes the parties to get a higher beneﬁt from the inputs traded. The
decrease in the distance between Si and Bj causes the outside option of Si to improve. Hence,
both changes enhance the suppliers’ investment incentives.
Corollary 2 implies that the quality of the inputs to which the buyers have access depends
critically on how diﬀerentiated their products are. The ﬁrms negotiate the price of the input
after the investment costs are sunk, at which time the input has limited alternative uses.
This leaves the suppliers in a weak bargaining position. A decrease in the degree of product
diﬀerentiation between the two ﬁnal goods results in an increase in the value of the suppliers’
outside options. The suppliers’ chances of recovering the sunk costs of their investment are
17better if the products of the buyers are more similar to each other. As the threat of hold-up
decreases, the suppliers’ incentives to invest increase.
The ﬁnding of Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006) provides an illustration of this result.
They analyze the link between asset speciﬁcity and underinvestment in the broiler indus-
try and show that underinvestment in this industry is negatively related to the number of
processors competing for grower services in a given area. We analyze in Section 5 how the
possibility of underinvestment may aﬀect the location decisions of the buyers.
4.2 No Capacity Constraints
If the suppliers are not capacity-constrained, the equilibrium location and investment choices
are given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 For given values of bi and bj, in the unique equilibrium of the game, Si sets
snc
i (bi,b j)=bi +











j (bi,b j)=0 .
Hence, in contrast with the case of capacity constraints, there is only one supplier choosing
a positive amount of investment in equilibrium. Both buyers purchase inputs from the same
supplier, which chooses to produce an input type that is exactly in the middle between the
two buyers’ ideal input types. In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that the other supplier
does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the market by investing a positive amount. Even in cases
when it could enter and produce a fully specialized input type, the buyers prefer to use a
common input type that is not fully specialized for their purposes in order to beneﬁtf r o mt h e
increased investment incentives of the single supplier. When both buyers buy inputs from the
18same supplier, that supplier has increased incentives to invest because of the high demand it
faces.
As in the case of capacity constraints, the supplier’s investment choice increases as the





(1 − bi − bj)
2
< 0 (29)
given 1−bj −bi > 0. However, unlike the case of capacity constraints, the investment choice
is aﬀected by the location choices of the buyers simply because the supplier sells inputs to
both of the buyers. The trade partners get a higher beneﬁt from the inputs traded if they
are located closer together. Hence, the supplier’s payoﬀ increases as the degree of product
diﬀerentiation in the downstream market decreases not because its outside option is improved,
but because it can beneﬁt more from the units it sells to the buyers.
5 Product Choices in the Downstream Market
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the buyers choose their locations to maximize their payoﬀs.
Our goal in this section is to analyze how vertical interactions aﬀect the product choices of
buyers of inputs. Again, we ﬁrst consider the case of capacity constraints and then compare
the results with those under no capacity constraints.
5.1 Capacity Constraints
Substituting for the suppliers’ equilibrium location and investment choices from Proposition
3i nC (i) reveals that this inequality always holds for all bi,b j ∈ [0,1]. Hence, buyer Bi
maximizes (7) taking bj as given. After substituting for sc
i (bi,b j) and ec
i (bi,b j) in (7), we get
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
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19This expression illustrates the several eﬀects that shape the location choices of the buyers.
The ﬁrst two terms, (p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K, represent the proﬁt level of Bi if it does not
purchase any inputs. It is easy to verify that this is decreasing in bi. In order to relax the
price competition between themselves, the ﬁrms would prefer to locate as far from each other
as possible. We refer to this as the competition eﬀect.








, represents the beneﬁt Bi gets from
using Si’s input. This beneﬁt has two components. First, it depends on the level of investment
made by Si. Corollary 2 implies that ec
i (bi,b j) is increasing in bi because an increase in bi
results in a decrease in the degree of product diﬀerentiation in the downstream market. Hence,
in order to increase the investment incentives of their suppliers, the buyers prefer to locate
closer to each other. This is the investment eﬀect. Suppliers can increase their bargaining
power by locating closer to the alternative buyer. However, doing so means they decrease the
beneﬁt they get from the buyer they trade with. If this buyer locates closer to the alternative
buyer, the supplier beneﬁts without bearing any costs.
The beneﬁt Bi gets from using Si’s input also depends on how suitable Si’s input is for
Bi’s purposes, which is represented by
³




.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h i s
term is increasing in bi.T h i sspeciﬁcity eﬀect reﬂects the fact that the buyers always like to
locate close to the suppliers they trade with. They know that for given values of bi and bj,
the suppliers always choose locations between them. The speciﬁcity eﬀect indicates that for
a given value of bj,a sbi increases, the distance between Bi and Si decreases and the buyer
beneﬁts from using an input which is more suitable for its purposes.
The last term in (30) implies that buyer Bi’s payoﬀ is decreasing in the outside option
of Si. In order to have a strong bargaining position, Bi would like the outside option of Si
to be as low as possible. The value of Si’s outside option decreases as the buyers move away
from each other, i.e., as bi decreases. This is because as bi decreases, si also decreases and
Si’s input becomes less suitable for the needs of the alternative buyer in the market. This
bargaining eﬀect causes the buyers to prefer to locate as far from each other as possible.
20We now analyze the location choices of the buyers. The location choice of Bi depends on











t(3 + bi − bj)
2 (1 − bi − bj)
18
− K.( 3 1 )
Given the symmetry between the ﬁrms, we focus on symmetric equilibrium. Note that
when t =0 , the optimal product choices are bc
i = bc
j = bc = 1
2.T h a ti s ,w h e nt h ec o n s u m e r s
are indiﬀerent about which variety they consume, the ﬁrms prefer to locate in the middle. In
the proof of Proposition 5, we show that as t increases, bnc monotonically decreases. Hence,
we can state the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose the suppliers face capacity constraints. For suﬃciently low values
of t, the investment and speciﬁcity eﬀects dominate the competition and bargaining eﬀects,
and the buyers choose to be less than maximally diﬀerentiated.
Al o wt value means that the buyers can more easily attract the consumers with the most
extreme tastes. This implies that even with maximum diﬀerentiation, the buyers face intense
competition because the consumers care less about consuming a variety that is diﬀerent from
their ideal one. Proposition 5 states that as t decreases and the buyers cannot eﬀectively
decrease the rivalry between them by locating further away from each other, the investment
and speciﬁcity eﬀects start to play relatively more important roles in their location decisions.
Hence, they may choose less than maximum diﬀerentiation in order to increase the investment
incentives of the suppliers and in order to be able to use more suitable inputs.14
14To isolate the investment and speciﬁcity eﬀects, one can consider a limited version of the current model
where the suppliers cannot locate anywhere they want along the unit line and they have to locate with one
of the buyers. This may be because they need location-speciﬁc technological information that the buyers can
give to them in order to locate at a certain point. Assuming si = bi, one can show that the buyers would like
to approach each other purely in order to improve the outside options of their suppliers.
215.2 No Capacity Constraints
We now consider the buyers’ product choices in the ﬁrst stage of the game assuming the
suppliers do not have capacity constraints. The results in Section 4 indicate that for all
bi,b j ∈ [0,1], there is only one supplier making a positive amount of investment in equilibrium.
Hence, buyers Bi and Bj maximize (18) and (19) respectively.
Substituting for the equilibrium location and investment choices reveals that these two
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2 (1 − bi − bj)
18
− K.( 3 3 )
The product choice of Bi is aﬀected by the competition, investment, and speciﬁcity eﬀects
as speciﬁed above. The competition eﬀect is negative while the investment and speciﬁcity
eﬀects are positive. However, the reason for the investment eﬀect is diﬀerent in this case from
the reason for the investment eﬀect in the case of capacity constraints. Unlike in the case of
capacity constraints, a single supplier provides inputs to both buyers. It invests more when
the buyers are located closer together because the value created from the use of the inputs is
higher.
As in the case of capacity constraints, it is straightforward to show that when t =0 ,t h e
optimal location choices are bnc
i = bnc
j = bnc = 1
2. Hence, we again have the result that for
suﬃciently low values of t, the investment and speciﬁcity eﬀects dominate the competition
eﬀect.
Proposition 6 Suppose the suppliers face no capacity constraints. For suﬃciently low values
of t, the investment and speciﬁcity eﬀects dominate the competition eﬀect, and the buyers
choose to be less than maximally diﬀerentiated.
The proof of Proposition 6 is similar to the proof of Proposition 5 and is omitted. It shows
22that as the measure of consumer loyalty, t, decreases, the buyers have increased incentives to
agglomerate in the middle.
These results indicate that once we extend the classic Hotelling model with quadratic
costs to take into account the dynamics of the interactions between upstream suppliers and
downstream buyers, buyers dealing with small-scale suppliers which face capacity constraints
may choose intermediate locations in the product space in order to improve the outside
options of their suppliers. On the other hand, buyers dealing with suppliers that are not
capacity-constrained relative to the buyers’ needs may choose intermediate locations in the
product space in order to be close to the only supplier in the market which is located in the
middle.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Under incomplete contracts, the investment decisions of parties depend critically on the speci-
ﬁcity of the investments. This paper has investigated the link between investment decisions
and product choices of ﬁrms in the context of bilateral duopoly. We have considered an
environment where buyers care about the suitability of the inputs they use for their own
purposes and input prices are determined by bilateral negotiations. While making their in-
vestment decisions, suppliers decide both what type of input to produce and how much eﬀort
to put into it. The degree of speciﬁcity is endogenously determined in the model through the
product choices made by all the ﬁrms in the market.
We have shown that if the suppliers are capacity-constrained, the degree of product
diﬀerentiation in the downstream market aﬀects both the location and investment decisions
of the suppliers. As the degree of product diﬀerentiation increases, the suppliers choose to
produce input types that are less suitable for the purposes of the buyers with which they
intend to trade. They trade oﬀ the value of the input for its intended buyer and the value
of the input in its alternative uses. In order to balance these two forces, they refrain from
23producing fully specialized inputs.
The suppliers’ investment levels are decreasing in the degree of product diﬀerentiation in
the downstream market. This implies that the buyers may strategically commit to competi-
tion in order to alleviate lock-in.15 Producing more similar products improves the bargaining
positions and, hence, the investment incentives of their suppliers. Thus, in contrast with
the maximum diﬀerentiation result of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), they may choose to be
less-than-maximally diﬀerentiated.
If suppliers are not capacity-constrained, there is only one supplier making a positive
amount of investment in the market. The supplier chooses to locate between the two buyers.
The buyers may choose intermediate locations to increase the investment incentives of the
supplier and to have access to more suitable inputs.
We conclude by mentioning some avenues along which the current analysis can be ex-
tended. First, it would be interesting to analyze the capacity choices of the suppliers. In
a model that endogenizes the capacity choices of the suppliers, one could explore the eﬀect
of bargaining power on capacity choice. Second, we have assumed that the ﬁrms divide the
gains from trade according to an exogenously determined sharing rule. In a model that en-
dogenizes the sharing rule, one could analyze whether there are cases when either the buyers
or the suppliers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to commit to having low bargaining power.
15Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Shepard (1987) also analyze the strategic use of commitment to competition
in order to alleviate lock-in in diﬀerent settings.
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27Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1-5.
1 Proof of Proposition 1
To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game, we start with the second
stage and work backward. At the end of the ﬁrst stage, there are 3 types of subgames.
1. Both pairs have reached an agreement in the ﬁrst stage.
2. Only one of the pairs has reached an agreement in the ﬁrst stage.
3. Neither pair has reached an agreement in the ﬁrst stage.
We consider what happens in the second stage of the bargaining game in each type of
subgame. In a subgame of type 1, no more trade takes place in the second stage because the
suppliers do not have any more units to sell. In a subgame of type 2, only one of the pairs
has reached an agreement. Suppose it is Bi − Si.S i n c eSi does not have any other units to
sell in the second stage, Bj cannot obtain any units from it. However, Bi can get another
unit from Sj.
For Bi and Sj, the gains from trade are
ej
³
1 − (1 − bi − sj)
2
´
.( A . 1 )
This is the beneﬁt Bi would get from using Sj’s unit of input. Bi and Sj receive the sum
of their share of this amount and their outside option. Bi’s outside option is determined
by the amount it would make in the downstream market without using Sj’s input. Sj’s
outside option is 0 since it cannot ﬁnd another trading partner after the second stage of the
bargaining game.
In a subgame of type 3, both of the suppliers still have one unit to sell in the second stage.
Consider the negotiation between Bi and Sj for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. The gains from trade
are as in (A.1). They receive the sum of their share of this amount and their outside option
as described above.
28We can now analyze the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game, where Bi − Si and Bj − Sj
bargain simultaneously. We would like to determine mutual best responses.
Consider the negotiation between Bi and Si. We consider two cases depending on whether
or not Bj and Sj trade. Suppose Bj and Sj do not trade. What are Bi and Si’s best responses?
If they trade, we have a subgame of type 2 in the second stage, where Bi buys a second unit
from Sj. Bi and Si’s joint proﬁts in the ﬁrst stage are
WBi +WSi =( p∗












1 − (bi − si)
2
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.( A . 2 )
If they do not trade, we have a subgame of type 3. Their joint proﬁts are
WBi + WSi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗













1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
.( A . 3 )
Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) gives the gains from trade. Provided that Bj and Sj do not
trade, it is a best response for Bi and Si to trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game if
ei
∙³







1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´¸
≥ 0.( A . 4 )
Suppose Bj and Sj trade. What are Bi and Si’s best responses? If they trade, we have a
subgame of type 1 in the second stage of the bargaining game. Bi and Si’s joint proﬁts are
WBi + WSi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ei
³
1 − (bi − si)
2
´
.( A . 5 )
I ft h e yd on o tt r a d e ,w eh a v eas u b g a m eo ft y p e2i nt h es e c o n ds t a g e ,w h e r eSi negotiates
with Bj in the second stage and receives (1/2)ei
³
1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
. Bi does not have any
other input supplier it can turn to, so it does not buy any inputs. Bi and Si’s joint proﬁts
are
WBi + WSi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗





1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
.( A . 6 )
Subtracting (A.6) from (A.5), we get the gains from trade. Provided that Bj and Sj trade,
it is a best response for Bi and Si to trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game if (A.4)
holds.
29We label the inequality in (A.4) as C (i). Whether or not Bj and Sj trade, Bi and Si
trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game if C (i) holds. Hence, if both C (i) and C (j)
hold, then both Bi − Si and Bj − Sj will trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. Bi
can expect payoﬀso f
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
















which is the sum of its share of the gains from trade and its outside option, (p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
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1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
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.( A . 8 )
We know that if Bi and Si do not trade, we have a subgame of type 1 where Si sells its unit of
input to Bj in the second stage of the bargaining game. Hence, its outside option in the ﬁrst
stage is (1/2)ei
³
1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
.I t sp a y o ﬀ is its share of the gains from trade deﬁned in
(A.4) and the value of its outside option.
If only C (i) holds, then Bj and Sj do not trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game,
but Bi and Si do. We have a subgame of type 2 in the second stage of the bargaining game,
where Bi can purchase a second unit from Sj. Hence, Bi’s payoﬀ is
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗




















1 − (1 − bi − sj)
2
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,( A . 9 )
where the last term represents the beneﬁt of the input it purchases from Sj. Bj has no inputs,








2) − K.( A . 1 0 )



























since it sells its unit of input to Bi in the second stage.
If neither C (i) nor C (j) holds, then none of the pairs trade in the ﬁrst stage of the
bargaining game and a subgame of type 3 is reached in the second stage. Bi and Sj’s payoﬀs
are
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗














1 − (1 − bi − sj)
2
´
.( A . 1 4 )
2 Proof of Proposition 2
To solve for the equilibrium of the bargaining game, we start with the second stage and work
backward. At the end of the ﬁrst stage, there are 6 types of subgames.
1. Both pairs have traded 2 units in the ﬁrst stage.
2. Both pairs have traded 1 unit in the ﬁrst stage.
3. Both pairs have traded 0 units in the ﬁrst stage.
4. One of the pairs has traded 2 units and the other one has traded 1 unit in the ﬁrst
stage.
5. One of the pairs has traded 2 units and the other pair has traded 0 units in the ﬁrst
stage.
6. One of the pairs has traded 1 unit and the other pair has traded 0 units in the ﬁrst
stage.
We consider what happens in the second stage of the bargaining game in each type of
subgame.
I nas u b g a m eo ft y p e1 ,n om o r et r a d et a k e sp l a c ei nt h es e c o n ds t a g eb e c a u s ee a c hb u y e r
can use at most 2 units of input. In all the other types of subgames, either one or both of
the pairs have traded less than 2 units in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. Since the
31suppliers are not capacity-constrained, this implies that the buyers that have less than 2 units
can obtain inputs in the second stage. Their ability to do so does not depend on whether or
not trade took place between the other pair in the ﬁrst stage.
Consider the negotiation between Bi and Sj in the second stage. For each unit that they
negotiate over, the gains from trade are
ej
³
1 − (1 − bi − sj)
2
´
.( A . 1 5 )
Hence, Bi buys enough units from Sj so that it has 2 units in total.
In the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game, Bi − Si and Bj − Sj bargain simultaneously.
We would like to determine mutual best responses. Consider the negotiation between Bi and
Si. We consider three cases depending on whether Bj and Sj trade 0, 1 or 2 units. Suppose
Bj and Sj do not trade. What are Bi and Si’s best responses? Si can negotiate with and
sell 2 units to Bj in the second stage whether or not it trades with Bi in the ﬁrst stage. It
earns 2(1/2)ei
³





1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
from doing so. If Bi and Si do
not trade either, Bi can negotiate with Sj. The gross beneﬁt it gets from trading with Sj is
ej
³
1 − (1 − sj − bi)
2
´
. Hence, Bi and Si’s joint proﬁts in case of not trading are
WBi + WSi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ej
³










If they trade 1 unit, Bi can obtain one more unit from Sj in the second stage. Bi and
Si’s joint proﬁts are
WBi + WSi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗















1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
.( A . 1 7 )
Finally, if they trade 2 units, their joint proﬁts are
WBi +WSi =( p∗









1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
.( A . 1 8 )
32Comparing the joint proﬁt s ,w ec a ns e et h a tBi − Si trade 2 units if
ei
³












and trade 0 units if (A.19) does not hold. (A.19) implies that since Bi always has the option
of trading with Sj, trade takes place between Bi and Si if it creates a larger surplus than
what Bi can get by trading with Sj.
A similar analysis reveals that the best response of Bi and Si in the cases when Bj and
Sj trade 1 or 2 units is determined by (A.19) also. Hence, we ﬁnd that for every possible
strategy of Bj and Sj, Bi and Si trade 2 units if (A.19) holds and 0 units if it does not.
We label the inequality in (A.19) as NC(i).I fb o t hNC(i) and NC(j) hold, then both
pairs will trade 2 units in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining game. The payoﬀso fBi and Si
are
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
i,p ∗
2) − K + ei
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i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ei
³






















1 − (1 − bi − sj)
2
´
.( A . 2 1 )
If only NC(i) holds, then Bj and Sj do not trade in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining
game. The payoﬀso ft h eﬁrms are
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ei
³



















2) − K + ei
³






2 − (bi − si)












WSj =0 .( A . 2 5 )
If neither NC(i) nor NC(j) holds, then none of the pairs trades in the ﬁrst stage of the
33bargaining game. Bi and Sj’s payoﬀsa r e
WBi =( p∗
i − c)Di (p∗
1,p ∗
2) − K + ej
³






1 − (1 − bj − si)
2
´
.( A . 2 7 )
3 Proof of Proposition 3
Supplier Si has two options. It can either sell its input to buyer Bi in the ﬁrst stage or to
buyer Bj in the second stage. It chooses the option that yields the higher payoﬀ.
If it serves Bi, then its payoﬀ function is given by (A.8). Taking the partial derivatives
with respect to si and ei and solving the ﬁrst-order conditions give
si = bi +





9 − 2(1− bi − bj)
2
24
.( A . 2 9 )
It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition is satisﬁed. Substituting these
expressions in C (i) we can see that it holds. If Si chooses these location and investment
levels, its payoﬀ is
WSi =
h




.( A . 3 0 )











i.( A . 3 1 )
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to si and ei and solving the ﬁrst-order conditions
give





.( A . 3 3 )
34Substituting these expressions in C (i) we can see that it does not hold if (1/2)−(1 − bj − bi)
2 <
0.I fC (i) holds, then Si can choose si and ei such that C (i) does not hold. Doing so would
yield a lower payoﬀ than choosing (A.32) and (A.33). Hence, if Si’s payoﬀ when it chooses
(A.32) and (A.33) is lower than (A.30), then the optimal choices are (A.28) and (A.29).
Substituting for the location and investment choices given by (A.32) and (A.33) in (A.31)
gives WSi =1 /16.T h i sp a y o ﬀ is lower than the one in (A.30) if
h




This inequality always holds since bi,b j ∈ [0,1].
4 Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed in two steps.
(i) We ﬁrst show that the location and investment choices given in Proposition 4 constitute
an equilibrium. We do this by arguing that neither ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate.
In equilibrium, supplier Si earns the maximum possible level of proﬁtb yb e i n gt h es o l e
supplier of inputs to both of the buyers. Hence, it cannot do any better by deviating. Sj,o n
the other hand, makes 0. We need to check whether it can earn a positive proﬁt by setting
sj and ej such that it trades with buyer Bj only, with buyer Bi only, or with both of the
buyers.
If it trades with Bj,i t sp a y o ﬀ is
WSj = ej
³












j.( A . 3 4 )
The unconstrained optimum is sj = bj and ej =1 /2.F o r Bj to prefer to trade with Sj,
NC(j) must be holding. Given the equilibrium strategy of Si, this condition is satisﬁed.










,( A . 3 5 )
which is negative for all bi,b j ∈ [0,1]. Hence, this is not a proﬁtable deviation.
35If it trades with Bi,i tm a k e s
WSj = ej
³




j.( A . 3 6 )
The location and investment choices that maximizes this payoﬀ function are sj =1− bi and
ej =1 /2.F o rBi to prefer to buy from Sj instead of from Si,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tNC(i)
is violated. That is,
ei
³








1 − (1 − bi − sj)
2
´
< 0.( A . 3 7 )
Given the equilibrium strategy of Si, this condition is not satisﬁed at the unconstrained
optimum stated above. Supplier Sj can choose sj and ej such that this condition is just
satisﬁed. The constrained optimal choices are sj =1− bi and ej =
³



























⎠.( A . 3 8 )
Again, since this is negative for all bi,b j ∈ [0,1],w ed on o th a v eap r o ﬁtable deviation.
Finally, Sj can set sj and ej such that both buyers prefer to trade with it. This implies
that its choices must violate NC(i) and satisfy NC(j). S’s payoﬀ is given by
WSj = ej
³
2 − (bj − sj)













Note that if we evaluate NC(i) and NC(j) at the unconstrained optimum of this payoﬀ
function, both of them would be satisﬁed. Hence, Bi would prefer to trade with Si instead
of Sj.
We proceed by considering values of si and ei such that NC(i) is just violated. Note that
if we cannot ﬁnd a proﬁtable deviation that satisﬁes only one of the constraints, we cannot
ﬁnd a proﬁtable deviation that satisﬁes both constraints. Sj must set
ej =
³





1 − (1 − bi − e sj)
2
´,( A . 3 9 )
36where e sj represents the location choice that solves the constrained optimization problem.
These choices of sj and ej constitute a proﬁtable deviation if they result in a positive proﬁt
level. Substituting for the expression for ej in Sj’s payoﬀ function we get
WSj =
³































This expression is ≤ 0 for all e sj,b i,b j ∈ [0,1].
Hence, we do not have any proﬁtable deviations. The location and investment choices
stated in Proposition 4 constitute an equilibrium.
(ii) We next show that the equilibrium stated in Proposition 4 is unique. To do this, we
need to eliminate all other possible equilibria.
We start by establishing that in equilibrium, NC(i) for i =1 ,2 never bind. To prove by
contradiction, suppose not and suppose it is NC(1) that binds in equilibrium. Then S2 can
increase its investment by ε and cause a discontinuous upward jump in its payoﬀ function.
Since the cost of investment is continuous in the level of investment, there always exists a
suﬃciently small investment level that makes such a deviation proﬁtable.
This result implies that we can focus on the interior solutions to the suppliers’ optimization
problem as candidate equilibria. There are three types of candidate equilibria. We have
already shown that one of them is an equilibrium. To eliminate the other two, it is suﬃcient
to ﬁnd a proﬁtable deviation in each case.
Consider the candidate equilibrium where Si trades with Bi for i =1 ,2 in the ﬁrst stage
of the bargaining game. The optimum choices are si = bi and ei =1 /2. Note that these










.( A . 4 1 )
Now suppose S1 plays its equilibrium strategy and S2 deviates by choosing s2 and e2 such
37that it serves both buyers. Does this result in a higher payoﬀ level? It must be the case that
NC(1) is violated and NC(2) holds. S2 cannot set s2 and e2 at their unconstrained maximum
levels since doing so does not violate NC(1).I fi tc h o o s e ss2 and e2 such that NC(1) is just
violated, we get e2 =1 /
³
1 − (1 − b1 − b s2)
2
´
,w h e r eb s2 represents the constrained optimal
choice for location. S2 makes
WS2 =
³















1 − (1 − b1 − b s2)
2
´2.( A . 4 2 )
Since it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd only one proﬁtable deviation, let us set b s2 =1 /2. The payoﬀ
function given in (A.42) always yields a higher value than the payoﬀ function given in (A.41)
for all bi,b j ∈ [0,1].
Now consider the case when Si trades with Bj for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j in the second stage
of the bargaining game. The optimum location and investment choices are si =1− bj and
ei =1 /2.E a c h ﬁrm makes WSi =1 /4. Suppose S1 plays its equilibrium strategy and S2
deviates by choosing s2 and e2 such that it serves both buyers. It sets s2 = b2+(1− b1 − b2)/2
and e2 =1− (1 − b1 − b2)
2 /4.N o t et h a tNC(1) is violated and NC(2) is satisﬁed at these











.( A . 4 3 )
This is larger than 1/4 for all bi,b j ∈ [0,1].
Hence, the equilibrium where Si sells to both buyers and Sj sets ej =0is the unique
equilibrium.
5 Proof of Proposition 5
We can show that as t increases from 0, bc changes in a monotonic way by using the implicit
function theorem. Let G(bi,b j;t) stand for the ﬁrst derivative of WBi with respect to bi.I t
38is equal to
(1 − bi − bj)
3 − 3t(3 + bi − bj)(1+3bi + bj)
54
.( A . 4 4 )
This expression is equal to 0 at an interior solution. We can solve for the symmetric equilib-






,( A . 4 5 )
where the right hand side is evaluated at bc. Since the second-order condition is negative,




−(3 + bi − bj)(1+3bi + bj)
18
< 0.( A . 4 6 )
Hence, bc is a decreasing function of t.A st increases from 0, bc decreases from 1/2 to 0 in a
continuous fashion.
39